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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
the Southwestern Bell case: "The most serious vice of the pres-
ent rule for fixing the rate base is not the existing uncertainty,
but that the method does not lead to certainty. Under it, value
for rate-making purposes must ever be an unstable factor. In-
stability is a standing menace of renewed controversy. The
direct expense to the utility of maintaining an army of experts
and of counsel is appalling. The indirect cost is far greater.
The attention of officials, high and low, is necessarily diverted
from the constructive tasks of efficient operation and of develop-
ment. The public relations of the utility to the community are
apt to become more and more strained. And a victory for the
utility, may in the end, prove more disastrous than defeat would
have been." 35
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the merits
of prudent investment or of reproduction cost, but whichever
view is adopted, or if rate-making is declared to be a legislative
function, or if the rate be determined on the basis of index num-
bers, it is clear that the rule of Smyth p. Ames is no longer ap-
plicable. Nor is this view shared alone by those advocating
original cost; those in the camp of reproduction new also favor
it. As says Professor Goddard, 30 a strong advocate of the
prudent investment theory, "It is time Smyth v. Ames went into
the discard. It served as a good temporary bridge. It is no
longer safe and nobody trusts his weight on it, though nearly all
claim to be trusting it to carry their weight across the stream."
And, as is said by Mr. Frederic G. Dorety,3 7 an advocate of re-
production cost, after pointing out Mr. Justice Brandeis's rea-
sons for reconsideration of the Smyth v. Ames doctrine, "The
necessity for the statement in some definite principle in valua-
tion has not been exaggerated by him."
TOBIAS LEWIN, '32.
THE APPLICATION OF THE FRONT FOOT RULE TO
PROPERTY OF IRREGULAR SHAPE
The apportionment of the cost of public improvement has, for
the most part, been accomplished by one of two methods. Either
the benefit accruing to each specific piece of property so affected
is determined and the assessment made upon that basis, or a
benefit district is designated and the assessments are levied uni-
formly against the property owners within that district. The
latter plan has been most widely used in distributing the expense
of paving or resurfacing city streets, the district being laid out
35 Ibid.
86 N. 12 above.
37 Dorety, The Function of Reproduction Cost in Public Utility Valuation
und Rate Making (1923) 37 HAn. L. REv. 173.
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so as to encompass the property abutting on the improvement.
The cost of the work is then divided among the property owners
according to some uniform principle. A standard most fre-
quently used is the so-called front foot rule. Presumably the
property owners are benefited in proportion to the amount of
frontage which they own along the street. But frequently, it
happens that lots are irregular in shape. For instance, a lot ad-
jacent to an oblique intersection might be comparatively less
valuable than other property in the district, because of its pecu-
liar shape or its small area. The application of the front foot
rule to such situations precipitates a problem which has not been
considered by many courts in this country.
It will be profitable, in approaching this question, to advert to
the principles which underlie special assessments and to consider
the application of those principles to the apportionment of the
cost of public improvement by the front foot rule.' It is clear
that the power to levy special assessments arises from the sov-
ereign taxing power of the states. Judge Cooley,2 citing a large
number of authorities, remarks, "That these assessments are an
exercise of the taxing power has over and over again been af-
firmed until the controversy must be regarded as closed." It
has been argued that since special assessments are a form of
taxation and since no quid pro quo is necessary in the levy of a
tax, that benefits need not be rendered to the property owner
in order to validate a special assessment, since to require such
would be in effect demanding that the state give a consideration
for the exercise of its sovereign power of taxation. But the
law has been settled to the contrary by the leading case of Nor-
wood v. Baker,4 in which the court invalidated a special assess-
ment, saying, "In our judgment, the exaction.., of the cost of a
public improvement in substantial excess of the special benefits
accruing to the property owner is to the extent of such excess at
least, a taking of private property without compensation." The
special assessment is predicated upon the existence of a special
benefit conferred upon the abutting property by the object of the
assessment or tax.5 But it is not necessary to base the assess-
' No attempt has been made to consider the question as it impinges upon
cases where there has been a street widening project wherein the use of the
power of eminent domain is exercised.
2 Cooley, TAXATON (2d ed. 1886) 623.
3 This argument is well made by Mr. Harry Hubbard, Special Assess-
ments on Real Estate (1900) 14 HARv. L. REv. 1, 98.
4 (1898) 172 U. S. 269; French v. Barber Asphalt Co. (1901) 181 U. S.
324. See also to the same effect, Tonawanda v. Lyon (1901) 181 U. S. 389;
Wight v. Davison (1901) 181 U. S. 371.
5 McQuillin, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1928) sec. 2166 et seq. Moore v.
Yonkers (C. C. A. 2, 1916) 235 F. 485; N. W. Imp. Co. v. John Day Irr. Dist.
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ment upon the precise amount of benefit accruing to a particular
piece of ground. 6 The existence of benefit is a matter of fact
within the discretion of the legislative body so that whenever a
tax, assessment, or other burden is imposed by it, the owner of
property ordinarily cannot be said to have been deprived of his
property without due process of law, provided the legislature
has decided that special benefit will accrue.7 A presumption is
thus created to the effect that the legislative body has considered
the benefits and has provided for the assessment according to
those benefits.8 This, furthermore, is subject to rebuttal only
where it is shown that the assessment has been made arbitrarily
and without such considerations. 9 Under these cases it becomes
possible to establish benefit districts. The apportionment with-
in the district by means of the front foot rule has been repeated-
ly sanctioned.' 0 Of course it is true that the front foot rule is
not productive of exact equality. But the courts have recog-
nized that no system of taxation or assessment can achieve pre-
cise equality, and have refused to give much credence to the ob-
jection." In Gas Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co.,12 the
court said, ". . . the legislature may create taxing districts
to meet the expense of local improvements and may fix the basis
of assessment unless its action is palpably arbitrary or plain
abuse." It has become firmly established that the law-making
power may determine by statutory enactment that the property
abutting upon public improvements is specially benefited thereby
and that the frontage rule is a practicable and reasonably accu-
(D C. D. Ore. 1921) 286 F. 294; Carr v. Kissimmee (1920) 80 Fla. 754,
86 So. 701; Mt. Meyers v. State (1928) 95 Fla. 704, 117 So. 97; Tillman v.
Valdosta (1924) 159 Ga. 105, 125 S. E. 71; Asel v. Jefferson (1921) 287 Mo.
195, 229 S. W. 1046; Peterson v. Phillips (1926) 189 Wis. 246, 207 N. W.
268.
6 Davidson v. New Orleans (1877) 96 U. S. 97.
7 Ibid. L c. 99.
8 Tarboro v. Statton (1911) 156 N. C. 504, 72 S. E. 577; Lyon v. Hyatts-
ville (1915) 125 Md. 306, 93 Atl. 919; State ex rel. Oliver Mining Co. v. Ely(1915) 129 Minn. 40, 151 N. W. 545; Dineen v. Rider (1927) 152 Md. 343,
136 Atl. 754; Tarboro v. Forbes (1923) 185 N. C. 59, 116 S. E. 81.9 Martin, v. District of Columbia (1906) 205 U. S. 105.10 French, v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (1901) 181 U. S. 324; Avis v.
Allen (W. Va. 1919) 99 S. E. 188; Memphis v. Hill (1919) 141 Tenn. 250,
208 S. W. 613; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Munn (1905) 158 Mo. 552, 83
S. W. 1062; Driscoll v. Northbridge (1912) 210 Mass. 151, 96 N. E. 59;
Stingily v. Jackson (1925) 140 Miss. 19, 104 So. 465.
II Wendt v. Tucker (Ky. 1919) 216 S. W. 61; Philadelphia v. Salt Mfg.
Co. (1926) 286 Pa. 1, 132 Atl. 792; contra, Taylor & McBean Co. v. Chand-
ler (Tenn. 1877) 9 Heik. 349, 24 Am. Rep. 308; but see Nashville v. Madi-
son Park Land Co. (1927) 155 Tenn. 382, 293 S. W. 533.
12 (1915) 240 U. S. 55.
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rate method of apportioning such benefits. Such legislative judg-
ment is presumed to be correct and in accordance with the facts
until the contrary is shown.13
It was held in a leading case of Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Southern Roads Co.,14 that the application of the front foot
rule did not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In that cause a railroad right of way was assessed
to pay the cost of the street. The court said:
The mere fact that the appellant's lot is ... only 45 feet in
depth, while property on the other side of the street is 200
feet in depth, does not of itself establish an unreasonable
discrimination . . . Essentially the benefit derived from
a street improvement is the improved method of ingress
and egress to the abutting property. While in some meas-
ure the value of the property will vary somewhat with the
depth of that property, the variation is by no means in
arithmetical proportion to that depth. And a lot but 45
feet in depth, though it may not be as valuable as a lot oppo-
site which is 200 feet in depth, may have its value itcreased
by practically the same amount. . . Further it must be
remembered that exactitude is not required in these mat-
ters, and, if no substantial discrimination is worked, the ap-
portionment will be upheld.
It may readily be seen from the foregoing that what the court
requires to invalidate an assessment is a substantial showing
that there has been an injustice done. The appellant's evidence
had not shown such an unwarranted discrimination. There are
some cases which achieve a squarely contra result,15 but they are
clearly in the minority. But even in these jurisdictions, the
later cases permit the commissioner to "take into consideration
the number of front feet of the lot as an element in making the
assessment." 16
The whole tenor of the cases on the subject is to maintain an
equal front foot assessment on all property, proportionate to the
benefits, giving discretion to the assessing authorities to assess
for a number of feet less than that actually owned, but at the
regular price per front foot where justice and equity require it.' 7
10 State v. Ely (1915) 129 Minn. 40, 151 N. W. 545.
1" (1927) 217 Ky. 575, 290 S. W. 320.
15 Glencoe v. Uthe (1912) 253 Ill. 518, 97 N. E. 1057; Belleville v. Miller
(1918) 257 Ill. 244, 100 N. E. 946.
16 Stauton v. Bond (1918) 281 Ill. 586, 118 N. E. 47.
17 Richardson v. Hardie (1923) 85 Fla. 510, 96 So. 290; Memphis v. Hill,
n. 10 above; K. C. S. R. R. Co. v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 6 (1921) 256 U. S.
658; Huntington v. Gallagher (1926) 101 W. Va. 110, 132 S. E. 866; but see
Swayne v. Hattiesburg (1927) 147 Miss. 244, 111 So. 818.
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This can be done without running afoul the Fourteenth Amend-
ment unless the action is palpably arbitrary. Consequently the
owner of a lot which is irregular in shape may avoid the pay-
ment of an excessive assessment if he can show that the actual
benefit derived is plainly less than that derived by his neighbors.18
If he cannot show a palpable abuse of discretion with regard to
his property, he will not be heard to complain, because the courts
feel that to permit trifling objections to be raised will impede the
making of city improvements. There is little possibility of mak-
ing an accurate determination of the precise benefits in any case.
Mathematical accuracy cannot be attained in such matters as
this. Real estate values are fluctuating, influenced by a host of
factors besides public improvement. Ordinarily the beneficial
effect of an improvement will be uniformly felt throughout the
area or district in which it operates, and the courts have recog-
nized the practical truth of such an assumption.1 But where
through the operation of peculiar circumstances, such as the
shape of the lot, this beneficial effect will not be as great as
otherwise, othe courts can insist that an equitable adjustment be
made. For instance in the case of Johnson et al. v. Rudolph
et al.,20 involving a piece of property in the city of Washington,
D. C., the complainant's lot while fronting on the street for a dis-
tance of 200 feet varied in depth from 1 foot to 50 feet, whereas
a neighboring lot owned by another person, having a frontage of
280 feet ranged in depth from 261 to 326 feet. Nevertheless
these two properties, so obviously disproportionate in value were
taxed in such a manner (by the frontage rule) that the smaller,
with about 1/16 the area, paid 5/7 as much as the larger lot.
The court, on the authority of the Gast Realty Co. case,2 1 quash-
ed the assessment. An assessment entirely ignoring the matter
of depth of an owner's property as a factor in determining the
assessment it should bear, has been held improper as not propor-
tional to the benefits.22 An assessment whereby a triangular lot
bore a relatively heavy share of the burden has been held to be
inequitable. 23 It is generally conceded that the rule is one of
expedience. As mentioned above, public work would be greatly
impeded without it. Thus the courts have kept step with the
18 Cote v. Highland Park (1913) 173 Mich. 201, 139 N. W. 69, 71; West v.
Burke (1921) 286 Mo. 358, 228 S. W. 775. And see the following, Watts v.
City of Winfield (1917) 101 Kan. 470, 186 Pac. 319; Robert Noble's Estate
v. Boise City (1927) 19 F. (2d) 927.
19 Peterson v. City of Philips (1926) 187 Wis. 246, 207 N. W. 268.
20 (C. C. A. D. C. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 525.
21 N. 12 above.
22 Benshoof v. City of Iowa Falls (1916) 175 Iowa 30, 156 N. W. 898.
23 Inre St. Raymond Ave. in the city of New York. (1916) 175 App
Div. 578, 162 N. Y. S. 185.
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pace of modern municipal government and have recognized the
necessity of sanctioning this convenient and expedient method
of collecting the costs of public improvement. But they have not
lost sight of the fact that it is simply a rule of thumb, so to
speak, rather than a sacred principle of law. Thus, they find no
difficulty in adjusting a particular case wherein the rule has op-
erated to the manifest harm of an individual. There is nothing
in the front foot rule, or in the constitutional sanctioning of it,
that will prevent the courts from relieving a property owner
from a situation of palpable hardship.
A. W. PETCHAFT, '33.
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